Liquidity Provision, Ambiguous Asset Returns and the Financial Crisis by Spanjers, Willem
Review of Economic Analysis 10 (2018)  371-407                                             1973-3909/2010371 
371
Liquidity Provision, Ambiguous Asset Returns and the 
Financial Crisis 
 
WILLEM SPANJERS∗ 
 
Department of Economics 
School of Law, Social and Behavioral Sciences 
Kingston University 
and 
Rimini Center for Economic Analysis  
Department of Economics Wilfrid Laurier University 
 Empty 15 
For an economy with dysfunctional intertemporal financial markets the financial 
sector is modelled as a competitive banking sector offering deposit contracts. In a 
setting related to Allen and Gale (1998) properties of the optimal liquidity provision 
are analyzed for illiquid assets with ambiguous returns. In the context of our model, 
ambiguity — i.e. incalculable risk — leads to dynamically inconsistent investor 
behaviour. If the financial sector fails to recognize the presence of ambiguity, 
unanticipated fundamental crises may occur, which are incorrectly blamed on 
investors ‘losing their nerves’ and ‘panicking’. The basic mechanism of the Financial 
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Crisis resembles the liquidation of illiquid assets during a banking panic. The 
combination of providing additional liquidity and supporting distressed financial 
institutions implements the regulatory policy suggested by the model. A credible 
commitment to such ‘bail-out policy’ does not create a moral hazard problem.  
Rather, it implements the second best efficient outcome by discouraging excessive 
caution. Reducing ambiguity by increasing stability, transparency and predictability 
— as suggested by ordo-liberalism and the ‘Freiburger Schule’ — enhances ex-ante 
welfare. Empty 10 
Keywords: Financial Intermediation, Liquidity, Ambiguity, Choquet Expected Utility, 
Financial Crisis 
JEL Classification: D8, G1, G2 
 
1    Introduction 
The Financial Crisis re-fueled the debate on the causes of — and regulatory 
responses to — asset price bubbles and the crises they may cause. Despite unresolved 
issues on how to define and identify bubbles, a range of measures to prevent them 
was discussed. Under the impression of the losses, the desirability of avoiding 
inflated asset prices seemed to be taken for granted. Still, it is not obvious that 
bubbles are bad and should be prevented. In particular, the question should be 
addressed if it may be preferable to refrain from taking additional preventive 
measures and, instead, to resolve crises when they occur. 
As an example, consider the choice between a high technology growth strategy 
and one that relies on investments in low technology. Clearly, the former strategy is 
more prone to bubbles and crises than the latter. But if the difference in growth rates 
is high, crises do not occur too often, and the costs of a crisis are not excessive, the 
high technology strategy will be preferred. This is an example of ‘optimal financial 
crises’, as e.g. in Allen and Gale (1998), Spanjers (2008a) and Spanjers (2009). 
The above trade-off may seem more relevant for developing countries than for the 
industrialized states from which the Financial Crisis originated. Still, even for 
developed economies bubbles may be the price for progress. The seeds for life-
changing innovations tend to be laid in times of financial bubbles. Who would doubt 
that the benefits of the information and communication technology by far outweigh 
the costs of the dot.com bubble? Given the key role of technological progress in the 
long term improvement of living standards, such arguments in the spirit of Hayek 
(1935) deserve careful consideration. For more recent studies on the effects of 
bubbles on growth see e.g. Olivier (2000) and Caballero et al. (2006); for an 
empirical analysis of systemic crises and growth see e.g. Rancie`re et al. (2008). 
Rather than on preventing bubbles and crises at (almost) any cost, the discussion 
should focus on how to cushion the impact of crises if and when they occur. When 
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comparing the Great Depression, the Japan crisis in the 1990s, the Financial Crisis, 
and the Euro Crisis, it is clear that the effectiveness of dealing with crises has 
increased dramatically. For a discussion of the Financial Crisis see e.g. Hellwig 
(2008). 
Hellwig (2008) provides compelling arguments for the incompleteness and 
imperfection of the financial markets having played a key role both in triggering the 
crisis and in amplifying its effects. It seems reasonable to assume that in normal 
times the intertemporal liquidity allocation of the financial sector of the economy can 
be reasonably approximated by the invisible hand as in the Arrow-Debreu model. We 
argue that this is not the case in times of financial crises, when the aggregate liquidity 
demand differs strongly from that anticipated by the financial sector. In the latter 
respect, the approach taken is fundamentally different from that in Holmström and 
Tirole (1997). 
In situations where the aggregate liquidity demand differs strongly from that 
anticipated by the financial sector, the basic interactions in the financial system are 
not about the intra-temporal re-allocation of liquid and illiquid assets. Rather, they 
are about the decision whether to continue ongoing projects or to liquidate assets at a 
significant loss. For economies characterized by dysfunctional intertemporal markets, 
the aggregate institutional framework is better represented by the extreme case of an 
unregulated competitive banking sector, offering deposit contracts in the tradition of 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983). To capture the driving mechanism of the Financial 
Crisis, we extend the liquidity provision model of Eichberger and Harper (1997, 
Chapter 7) and Spanjers (1999/2008, Chapter 3) by introducing ambiguity (i.e. 
incalculable risk) regarding the payout structure of the illiquid asset. 
Fundamental aspects of the model – e.g. the presence of ambiguity, deposit taking 
institutions, and insufficient levels of loss absorbing equity – also relate to specific 
instances of the Financial Crisis. In particular, they play a role in the drying up of 
liquidity in the inter-bank money market during the sub-prime mortgage crisis, in the 
run on Northern Rock in the United Kingdom, in the bail-out of the mortgage giants 
Freddie Mac and Fanny Mae, and in the collapse of Lehman Brothers. But we 
maintain that the relevance of the aggregate problems of intertemporal liquidity 
allocation surpass these specific instances. 
Our point of departure is that each of these events was caused by an increase in 
incalculable risk or, as it is referred to in the relevant literature, ambiguity. Knight 
(1921) and Keynes (1937) provide an intuition for differentiating between 
(calculable) risk and (incalculable) ambiguity. We use a simple representation of 
ambiguity by Eichberger and Kelsey (1999) in the tradition of Ellsberg (1961). It is 
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integrated in a linear model of liquidity provision with risky assets related to Jacklin 
and Bhattacharya (1988) and Allen and Gale (1998). 
The effects of ambiguity in a financial and monetary setting have been analyzed in 
a number of papers. For the effects on financial markets see e.g. Dow and Werlang 
(1992), Epstein and Wang (1994) and Agliardi et al. (2015, and 2016); for the effects 
on financial institutions see e.g. Spanjers (1999/2008,), Eichberger and Spanjers 
(2008) and Spanjers (2008a). The impact of ambiguity on monetary policy has 
amongst others been addressed in Hansen and Sargent (2001), Wagner (2007), 
Ghatak and Spanjers (2007) and Spanjers (2008). Brach and Spanjers (2012) consider 
the impact of ambiguity in the form of incalculable political risk on development 
strategies and growth in the Middle East and Northern Africa. 
In our model financial crises — which are modelled as banking panics in the 
financial sector of the economy — can be triggered by an increase in the level of 
ambiguity experienced by investors.  Such a loss of confidence can be caused by 
events that are exogenous to the model. More interestingly, the arrival of new 
information on the prospects of the asset returns can lead to an endogenous loss of 
confidence through the updating of ambiguous beliefs. If one is not aware of the 
presence of ambiguity, this endogenous loss of confidence can easily be mistaken for 
an irrational overreaction by investors. Spanjers (1999/2008a) shows that this 
mechanism can also be used to explain the 1997 East-Asian crisis. 
As some observers noted — one of them being the former President of the 
Bundesbank, Axel Weber — the problems with mortgage and asset backed securities 
had strong similarities with the bank runs in the theoretical models, as did the 
problems of hedge funds. 
 
‘The current turmoil in the financial markets has all the 
characteristics of a classic banking crisis, but one that is taking place 
outside the traditional banking sector, Axel Weber, president of the 
Bundesbank, said at the weekend.[...] 
Some Federal Reserve policymakers also privately see 
comparisons between the current distress in credit markets and the 
bank runs of the 19th century, in which savers lost confidence in 
banks and demanded their money back, creating a spiralling liquidity 
crisis for institutions that had invested this money in longer-term 
assets.[...] 
“What we are seeing at the moment is a total overreaction,” he 
said. “There is no overall problem in terms of solvency – it is one of 
liquidity.” He said the challenge for central banks – which cannot 
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supply liquidity directly to the non-bank sector – was to help banks 
absorb the influx of assets onto their balance sheets.’ 
(Financial Times, 2nd September 2007) 
 
We use our theoretical model to propose and evaluate policy measures. One 
possibility is to prevent financial crises by requiring that ‘prudential’ low-risk 
investment strategies are pursued. An alternative measure is for the public sector to 
underwrite ‘toxic assets’ to counteract the loss of confidence. 
The results of our analysis are revealing. The effectiveness of requiring the 
financial sector to ‘prudentially’ follow low-risk investment strategies is less clear 
than may be expected. Like the financial system, our model is driven by 
undiversifiable systematic risk. Any regulation that reduces this undiversifiable risk 
must by its very nature affect the aggregate state contingent returns on investment. 
The investment decisions in our model involve a choice between a low yielding 
liquid asset and an illiquid asset, which provides a high expected yield when it 
matures, but which incurs a loss in the case of premature liquidation. The latter 
occurs in a financial crisis. If the anticipated return on the illiquid asset is sufficiently 
higher than that of the liquid asset; if the costs of liquidation are low; and/or the 
occurrence of a crisis is unlikely, the benefits of the higher returns outweigh the 
losses incurred in the occasional crisis. Under such circumstances, any regulation 
causing the financial sector to ‘prudentially’ follow less risky investment strategies 
damages the long run prospects of the economy. 
Considering the underwriting of ‘toxic assets’ by the public sector, we find that 
this is an effective policy measure which removes the distortive effects of the 
presence of ambiguity. Furthermore, the direct cost of underwriting only reflects the 
amount of risk that is insured, whereas its main impact is through the costless (and 
priceless) insurance of the unfounded fear caused by the presence of ambiguity. 
An often-mentioned concern regarding the underwriting of toxic assets is that it 
creates a moral hazard problem, reducing financial institutions’ incentives to follow 
prudent investment strategies. If the policy is anticipated, it is claimed to encourage 
overly risky investment decisions in the anticipation of being bailed out in a crisis. 
This argument does not apply for the model of this paper. 
On the contrary, for the range of parameter values we consider, it is the potential 
loss due to the premature liquidation of illiquid assets that distorts incentives. These 
liquidation losses make financial institutions follow overly cautious investment 
strategies. As a result, the overall investment strategy is not as profitable as it could 
have been given the information constraints, i.e. the outcomes fails to be second best 
efficient. 
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The anticipation and implementation of a bail-out policy when a crisis occurs 
corrects these distorted incentives, thus removing a moral hazard problem, rather 
than creating one. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic 
model. The second best efficient liquidity allocation is determined in Section 3. 
Section 4 analyzes the liquidity provision by an unregulated financial sector. In 
Section 5 it is established that the liquidity provision by an unregulated financial 
sector is not second best efficient and regulatory measures are discussed. Section 6 
addresses the impact of a failure to recognize the presence of ambiguity and 
concluding remarks are made in Section 7. These remarks relate to dynamic 
inconsistency in updating ambiguous beliefs and provide policy recommendations. 
2. The Basic Model 
We consider a simplified linear model in the spirit of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) 
and Jacklin and Battacharya (1988). Investors contribute initial wealth to pooled 
investment vehicles (‘banks’) that choose between investing in a riskless liquid low 
yield asset and a risky illiquid asset with a high expected return. After one period, 
investors obtain two signals: a public signal regarding the perspectives of the risky 
asset and a private signal regarding their own immediate liquidity needs. On the basis 
of this information they decide whether or not to withdraw their initial contributions. 
If too many investors withdraw their contributions, illiquid assets will be liquidated 
and a ‘banking panic’ (i.e. a financial crisis) occurs. 
The model differs from the usual setting in an important way. In our formulation 
investors’ immediate liquidity needs are the basis for the withdrawal of funds, 
whereas in the setting of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) withdrawals are caused by an 
increase in the individual probability of not surviving to enjoy the future high returns 
of the illiquid assets. In terms of investors’ preferences, this changed setting leads to 
a qualitatively different ex-ante expected utility function. 1 
                                                 
1 In the context of the current paper the two approaches lead to very different results. Under the 
assumption of differences in immediate liquidity preference, the optimal reserve holdings for 
the social planner and for the representative bank are both determined by the incentive 
constraints for the ad interim patient investors. Under the assumption of differences in 
preference for late consumption, however, the optimal reserve holdings for the social planner 
are determined by the incentive constraint of the ad interim impatient investors, whereas the 
optimal reserve holdings for the representative bank remain determined by the incentive 
constraint of the patient investors. The result of Theorem 6 that the anticipation and 
implementation of a bail-out policy leads to the second best efficient outcome, however, 
carries over. 
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Although the original Diamond-Dybvig setting is excellently suited to address 
issues surrounding the design and analysis of pension funds and different systems of 
pension provision, we maintain it is less suited for the analysis of the recent Financial 
Crisis, which was driven by more immediate liquidity needs, rather than long term 
considerations. 
2.1. Investment opportunities 
The three period economy of our model consists of a continuum I ≔ [0,1] of ex-ante 
identical investors who at t = 0 each have one unit of wealth. The economy offers 
two investment opportunities: a riskless liquid zero-yield asset called money and an 
illiquid asset which provides a high return when it matures and is successful, but 
leads to a severe loss when it matures and fails to be successful. In the period after 
investment decisions have been made, investors obtain a public signal regarding the 
prospects of the risky illiquid asset and a private signal regarding their individual 
liquidity needs. If they decide to prematurely liquidate their illiquid asset after 
receiving the signal, the severe loss can be prevented, but the initial investment will 
not be recovered in full. 
The following table states the pay-outs of the investments. 
 
 
Investment Period 0 Period 1 Period  2 Success Period  2 Failure
Money 0 to  1 −1 0 0 0 
Money 1 to  2 0 −1 1 1 
Investment matured −1 0 𝛼௛ 𝛼ℓ 
Investment  liquidated −1 𝛼ଵ 0 0 
 
The probabilities associated with the public signal regarding the prospects of the 
illiquid asset are as in the table below. It is assumed that the investments carry no 
idiosyncratic risk. All risk related to their payouts is non-diversifiable systematic 
risk. The signal σ ∈ {b, g} at t = 1 can be interpreted as a forecast of the economy’s 
prospects, the return ϱ ∈ {h, ℓ} as the actual economic development. 
 
 
Signal 𝜎 Payout 𝜚 Probability 𝜋ఙద 
𝑏 𝛼௛ 𝛿 
𝑏 𝛼ℓ 𝜀 
𝑔 𝛼௛ 1 − (𝛿 + 𝜀) 
𝑔 𝛼ℓ 0 
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The timing of the decisions of the investors is as follows:  
 
Period 0   Investment decisions 
Period 1  Individual liquidity preference 𝜃 ∈ {𝐻, 𝐿}  becomes privately known  
Signal 𝜎 ∈ {𝑏, 𝑔} becomes publicly known 
   Possibility for liquidation of assets 
   Consumption in Period 1 
Period 2:  Return 𝜚 ∈ {ℎ, ℓ}  occurs 
   Consumption in Period 2 
2.2. Beliefs 
The investors face uncertainty over their individual liquidity preference and over the 
combinations of signals and asset returns. This uncertainty is partly in the form of 
calculable risk and partly in the form of incalculable ambiguity. 
In particular, the investors face ex-ante risk with respect to their individual 
liquidity preference, which is either high (H) or low (L) and which is represented by 
θ ∈ {H, L}. The liquidity type of the investors is assumed to be independent of the 
asset state (σ, ϱ) ∈ {b, g} × {h, ℓ} . In addition to risk about their liquidity type, 
investors face ambiguity over the combinations of signals – good (g) or bad (b) – and 
asset returns – high (h) and low (ℓ) – that may arise. 
Investors’ uncertainty is over their individual state space {H, L} × {b, g} × {h, ℓ}. 
In the face of this uncertainty, their decisions will be guided by their beliefs over 
these combinations of potential outcomes. In particular, we assume investors’ beliefs 
over {H, L} × {b, g} × {h, ℓ}  to be represented by an E(llsberg)-capacity 
(π, {F஘}஘∈{ୌ,୐}, γ) which consist of: 
 
• an additive probability distribution 𝜋; 
• a level of confidence 𝛾 ∈ [0,1] in 𝜋; and 
• an additive partition of the state space with components 
 
𝐹ு ≔ {(𝐻, 𝑏, ℎ), (𝐻, 𝑏, ℓ), (𝐻, 𝑔, ℎ), (𝐻, 𝑔, ℓ)} and 
𝐹௅ ≔ {(𝐿, 𝑏, ℎ), (𝐿, 𝑏, ℓ), (𝐿, 𝑔, ℎ), (𝐿, 𝑔, ℓ)} 
 
The interpretation of these beliefs is as follows. Each investor has a conventional 
additive probability estimate of what may happen. This probability estimate is 
represented by the probability distribution 𝜋. The presence of ambiguity, however, 
causes the investors to have restricted confidence in the validity of this probability 
estimate. The level of confidence in the probability estimate is denoted by 𝛾, where  
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𝛾 = 1 denotes full confidence. In the case of 𝛾 = 0 the investor has no confidence in 
his probability estimate whatsoever; he thinks that anything may happen. 
The final element of the investor’s beliefs is represented by the additive partition 
of the state space. This partition captures the notion that investors may consider some 
aspects of the uncertainty they face to be best represented by calculable risk, while 
they may experience ambiguity with respect to other aspects. The components 𝐹ு 
and 𝐹௅ being ‘additive’ as indicated above means that the investor has full confidence 
in the probabilities he assigns to the events 𝐹ு  and 𝐹௅ , but fails to have full 
confidence in their sub-events and appropriate combinations thereof. The 
interpretation is that the investor faces risk with respect to his prospective individual 
liquidity needs, but faces ambiguity with respect to the signal and the return of the 
asset. Thus, investors’ beliefs are represented by E-capacities as in Eichberger and 
Kelsey (1999). See also Chateauneuf et al. (2007). 
2.3. Updating ambiguous beliefs 
The updating of ambiguous beliefs differs from the updating of additive ones. In 
particular, there is a number of competing natural generalizations of Bayes’ rule to 
the context with ambiguity. The first generalization that comes to mind when 
ambiguity is represented by belief functions is Full Bayesian updating as described in 
Jaffray (1992). This rule is best understood by considering the set of probability 
distributions that provides an equivalent representation of the belief function. In this 
setting, the Full Bayesian update is obtained by updating each of these probability 
distributions separately. Since the set of (multiple prior representations of) belief 
functions is closed under Full Bayesian updating, the updated set of priors once again 
represents a belief function. 
The problem with this Full Bayesian updating is that in the context of our 
application the initial belief functions are arrived at using the axiomatic approach to 
Choquet expected utility as in Schmeidler (1982/89) and Gilboa (1987). In this 
approach the beliefs are represented by a capacity, which not only represents the 
ambiguity faced by the decision maker, but at the same time includes the decision 
maker’s ambiguity attitude. Therefore, in using Full Bayesian updating, one would 
simultaneously update the ambiguous beliefs and the ambiguity attitude. Since the 
ambiguity attitude is best considered to be an individual characteristic of the decision 
maker – rather than a components of their beliefs – the implied updating of the 
ambiguity attitude would be inappropriate. 
In the context of dynamic preferences that result from updating, Gilboa and 
Schmeidler (1993) address this problem by providing an axiomatization of updating 
rules. Their analysis is based on the same fundamental concepts — i.e. preference 
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relations — that were used to derive the Choquet expected utility representation in 
the first place. They formulate ‘reasonable’ properties which a combination of 
dynamic preferences should satisfy. In the context of cautious/pessimistic decision 
makers they arrive at the Dempster-Shafer rule (see Dempster, 1968, and Shafer, 
1976) as a plausible rule for updating. In the context of exuberant/optimistic decision 
makers, they arrive at Bayes’ rule for updating capacities, which is not to be confused 
with Full Bayesian updating. 
When applied to the multiple priors representation of belief functions, the 
Dempster-Shafer rule is a ‘maximum likelihood’ rule. It restricts attention to those 
probability distributions in the initial set of priors for which the received signal had 
the highest probability. The set of updated priors is now obtained as the set of 
Bayesian updates of these ‘maximum likelihood’ additive priors. The updating 
results in another belief function. 
In our setting, the Full Bayesian update of the E-capacity and the Dempster-Shafer 
update of the E-capacity (which are also E-capacities) are identical. Therefore both 
interpretations of the capacity — describing ambiguity per se or describing a 
combination of ambiguity and ambiguity aversion — are consistent with our model. 
Applying the result of Eichberger and Kelsey (1999) regarding the updating of E-
capacities to our setting, we find that updating the ambiguous beliefs leads to: 
 
• Bayesian updating of the probability distribution 𝜋; and 
• an endogenous decrease in the level of confidence: 𝛾ఙ < 𝛾. 
 
Updating the E-capacity (π, {F஘}஘∈{ୌ,୐}, γ) after receiving the information σ for 
γ ∈ (0,1) one obtains the E-capacity ൫π஢, {F஘஢}஘∈{ୌ,୐}, γ஢൯ with 
 
 (𝜃, 𝑏) (𝜃, 𝑔) 
𝜋ఏఙ 𝛿𝛿 + 𝜀 1 
𝛾ఙ   𝛾 ∙ గ್ଵିఊ∙గ೒ = 𝛾 ∙
ఋା ఌ
ଵିఊ∙(ଵି(ఋାఌ)) ≤ 𝛾  𝛾 ∙
గ೒
ଵିఊ∙గ್ = 𝛾 ∙
ଵି(ఋାఌ)
ଵିఊ∙(ఋାఌ) ≤ 𝛾 
𝐹ఏఙ  ൛{(𝜃, 𝑏, ℎ), (𝜃, 𝑏, ℓ)}ൟ ൛{(𝜃, 𝑔, ℎ), (𝜃, 𝑔, ℓ)}ൟ 
2.4. Preferences 
The basic rational for the subjective expected utility approach is to describe beliefs 
separately from the evaluation of outcomes if and when they are attained. The beliefs 
typically relate to the likelihood with which certain outcomes or states of nature are 
expected to occur. The evaluation of outcomes normally takes place by a von 
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Neumann-Morgenstern utility index or — e.g. in the case of prospect theory — by a 
value function. In order to represent standard preference relations, the beliefs and the 
evaluation of outcomes are combined through an evaluation functional, e.g. by taking 
the expected value. 
In the Choquet expected utility approach, a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility 
index is applied for the evaluation of outcomes if and when they occur. The 
combination of the ambiguous beliefs and the ambiguity attitude of the decision 
maker are described by a non-additive probability distribution called a capacity. The 
Choquet integral is used to evaluate the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility index over 
such capacity. It is our purpose to analyse the impact of the level of ambiguity, rather 
than the impact of the ambiguity attitude, so we assume throughout the paper that in 
the face of ambiguity decision makers have a constant ambiguity attitude of full 
pessimism. 
To obtain a clear separation of the effects of risk from the effects of ambiguity, we 
assume investors are risk neutral. For an investor of (ad interim) liquidity type 
θ ∈ {H, L} we have the von Neumann- Morgenstern utility index 
𝑢(𝑥ଵ(𝜎), 𝑥ଶ(𝜎, 𝜚); 𝜃) = 𝛽ఏ ∙ 𝑥ଵ(𝜎) + 𝑥ଶ(𝜎, 𝜚) 
where 𝛽ு > 𝛽௅ > 1 reflects the intensity of the investor’s preference for liquidity at 
𝑡 = 1. 
An investor derives ex-ante utility from a state contingent income bundle 
𝑥 ≔ ቀ𝑥ଵఏ(𝜎), 𝑥ଶఏ(𝜎, 𝜚)ቁ(ఏ,ఙ,ద)∈{ு,௅}×{௕,௚}×{௛,ℓ}. 
The minimal utility obtained for liquidity preference 𝜃 within the additive component 
𝐹ఏ, given the type contingent income 𝑥ఏ(𝜎, 𝜚) ≔ ൫𝑥ଵఏ(𝜎), 𝑥ଶఏ(𝜎, 𝜚))൯, is denoted by 
𝑚ఏ(𝑥) ≔ min(ఏ,ఙ,ద)∈ிഇ 𝑢൫𝑥
ఏ(𝜎, 𝜚); 𝜃൯ = min(ఙ,ద)∈{௕,௚}×{௛,௘௟} 𝑢൫𝑥
ఏ(𝜎, 𝜚); 𝜃൯. 
The investor’s ex-ante Choquet expected utility function over a state contingent income 
bundle 𝑥 for beliefs ൫𝜋, {𝐹ఏ}ఏ∈{ு,௅}, 𝛾൯ is now obtained as 
𝑈(𝑥) ≔ 𝛾 ∙ 𝑬(ఏ,ఙ,ద)൛𝑢(𝑥ఏ(𝜎, 𝜚); 𝜃ൟ + (1 − 𝛾) ∙ 𝑬ఏ{𝑚ఏ(𝑥)}. 
2.5. Indirect Utility Representations 
When looking for graphical illustrations of ex-ante decision problems in a two 
dimensional diagram, one runs into obvious problems depicting investors’ 
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indifference curves. We circumvent these problems by using an indirect utility 
representation. This representation is based on type dependent income in terms of ex-
ante money holdings and ex-ante investments. 
In particular, for given fractions of money holdings 𝜇 and investments 1 − 𝜇, we 
consider 𝑦ு ≔ ഋഓಹ and 𝑦௅ ≔ భషഋഓಽ , where 𝜏ு ≔ 𝜋ு  and 𝜏௅ ≔ 𝜋௅ denote the population 
fractions of 𝐻−type investors and 𝐿−type investors, respectively. This enables us to 
depict the feasible combinations as a ‘budget line’ in a (𝑦ு, 𝑦௅) −diagram, 
independent of the institutional framework under consideration. To complete the 
illustration in the two dimensional diagram all we need is the appropriate counterpart 
of indifference curves. 
For this purpose we consider indifference curves of the indirect utility functions, 
which evaluate the outcomes obtained under the different institutional framework for 
various combinations (yୌ, y୐). For some of the institutional settings, we may find 
that there are different ways to define the associated indirect utility function V for 
out-of-equilibrium combinations (yୌ, y୐).  Therefore, the indirect utility functions 
require the specification of assumed out-of-equilibrium reactions. 
Once these indirect utility functions are arrived at, the decision problems for 
different institutional settings can be depicted within a single diagram. In particular, 
such diagram reveals whether different institutional settings lead to the same 
aggregate equilibrium money holdings and investments. But even if the equilibrium 
money holdings and investments are identical for two institutional settings, they may 
lead to different ex-ante utility levels for the investors. 
2.6. Assumptions on Parameter Values 
In the remainder of this paper, the following simplifying assumptions regarding the 
parameter values apply: 
 
1.  𝛿, 𝜀 > 0 and 𝛿 + 𝜀 < 1 
The assessed probability of each of the asset states (𝑏, ℎ) , (𝑏, ℓ)  and (𝑔, ℎ) 
exceeds zero. 
 
2.  𝛼ℓ = 0. 
The asset return in the case of failure is zero. 
 
3. βH > αh > βL. 
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From the ad interim perspective and assuming the asset is successful, 𝐻−types 
would have preferred holding their initial wealth as money, but 𝐿−types would 
have preferred investing in the illiquid asset. 
 
4. 𝛼ଵ ∙ 𝛽ு < 𝑪𝑬ద൛𝛼దห𝑏ൟ. 
Ad interim, 𝐻-type investors prefer the asset to mature, even after receiving a 
bad signal regarding the assets’ prospects. 
 
5.  𝛼ത௕ = 𝑬ద൛𝛼దห𝑏ൟ < 𝛽௅. 
This ensures that the aggregate fractional money holdings 𝜇௕(𝛾) are not second 
best efficient (see Theorem 1 below). It follows that for each level of confidence 𝛾 
we have 𝛽௅ > 𝛼෤௕ ≔ 𝑪𝑬ద൛𝛼దห𝑏ൟ. 
3. Second-Best Efficiency 
As a point of reference we consider second best efficiency. The results of any financial 
system based on voluntary participation cannot be worse than autarky. Nor can it 
outperform the second best efficient outcome. In particular, we analyze the symmetric 
ex-ante second best efficient liquidity allocation. This can be visualized as a social 
planner who maximizes the ex-ante utility of the ex-ante (at 𝑡 = 0) identical investors. 
Since the presence of ambiguity leads to dynamic inconsistency in the updating of 
investors’ beliefs, one must distinguish between the ex-ante beliefs used to evaluate the 
outcomes at 𝑡 = 0 and the updated beliefs which determine the investors’ ad interim 
behavior at 𝑡 = 1. 
3.1. The Planer’s Decision Problem 
To determine a second-best efficient outcome, a social planner offers an incentive 
compatible contract which maximizes the ex-ante utility of the (ex-ante identical) 
investors. At 𝑡 = 0, the planner decides which fraction 1 − 𝜇 of investors’ wealth is 
invested in the illiquid assets. For each liquidity type 𝜃 ∈ {𝐻, 𝐿} at 𝑡 = 1, the contract 
specifies payouts 𝑥ଵఏ(𝜎)  at 𝑡 = 1  which are contingent on the public signal 𝜎 ∈
{𝑏, 𝑔}. Furthermore, payouts 𝑥ଶఏ(𝜎, 𝜚) for 𝑡 = 2 are specified, contingent on both the 
public signal 𝜎 ∈ {𝑏, 𝑔} at 𝑡 = 1 and the return status 𝜚 ∈ {ℎ, ℓ} of the illiquid asset at 
𝑡 = 2. Since the liquidity type of the individual investors is private knowledge, the 
ex-ante utility is maximized subject to feasibility and incentive constraints. 
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At 𝑡 = 0, the planner decides for each signal 𝜎 ∈ {𝑏, 𝑔} the fraction 𝜆(𝜎) of assets 
that will be liquidated at 𝑡 = 1 and the fraction 𝜌(𝜎) of the money holdings that will 
be transferred to 𝑡 = 2. 2 The planner’s objective function is:  
𝑪𝑬(ఏ,ఙ,ద)൛𝛽ఏ ∙ 𝑥ଵఏ(𝜎) + 𝑥ଶఏ(𝜎, 𝜚)ൟ  = 
෍ 𝜋ఏ ∙ ቈ෍ 𝛾 ∙ ൣ𝛽ఏ ∙ 𝑥ଵఏ(𝜎ᇱ) + 𝑥ଶఏ(𝜎ᇱ, 𝜚′)൧(ఙ,ద)∈{௕,௚}×{௛,ℓ} ቉ఏ∈{ு,௅}
+ 
෍ 𝜋ఏ ∙ (1 − 𝛾) ∙ ൤ min(ఙᇲ,దᇲ)∈{௕,௚}×{௛,ℓ}ൣ𝛽ఏ ∙ 𝑥ଵ
ఏ(𝜎ᇱ) + 𝑥ଶఏ(𝜎ᇱ, 𝜚′)൧൨
ఏ∈{ு,௅}
 
The planner now faces the following decision problem: 
max
(௫భഇ(ఙ), ௫మഇ(ఙ,ద))(ഇ,഑,ഞ)∈{ಹ,ಽ}×{್,೒}×{೓,ℓ} ,ఓ ,(ఒ(ఙ),ఘ(ఙ))഑∈{್,೒}
𝑪𝑬(ఏ,ఙ,ద)൛𝛽ఏ ∙ 𝑥ଵఏ(𝜎) + 𝑥ଶఏ(𝜎, 𝜚)ൟ 
such that 
𝜋ு ∙ 𝑥ଵு(𝜎) + 𝜋௅ ∙ 𝑥ଵ௅(𝜎) = ൫1 − 𝜌(𝜎)൯ ∙ [𝛼ଵ ∙ 𝜆(𝜎) ∙ (1 − 𝜇) + 𝜇]  (𝐹ଵ) 
𝜋ு ∙ 𝑥ଶு(𝜎, ℎ) + 𝜋௅ ∙ 𝑥ଶ௅(𝜎, ℎ) = 
 𝜌(𝜎) ∙ [𝛼ଵ ∙ 𝜆(𝜎) ∙ (1 − 𝜇) + 𝜇] + 𝛼௛ ∙ (1 − 𝜇) ∙ (1 − 𝜆(𝜎))    (𝐹ଶ௛) 
𝜋ு ∙ 𝑥ଶு(𝜎, ℓ) + 𝜋௅ ∙ 𝑥ଶ௅(𝜎, ℓ) = 𝜌(𝜎) ∙ [𝛼ଵ ∙ 𝜆(𝜎) ∙ (1 − 𝜇) + 𝜇]   (𝐹ଶℓ) 
𝛽ு ∙ 𝑥ଵு(𝜎) + 𝑪𝑬ద{𝑥ଶு(𝜎, 𝜚)|𝜎}  ≥ 𝛽ு ∙ 𝑥ଵ௅(𝜎) + 𝑪𝑬ద{𝑥ଶ௅(𝜎, 𝜚)|𝜎}  (𝐼𝐶ுఙ) 
𝛽௅ ∙ 𝑥ଵ௅(𝜎) + 𝑪𝑬ద{𝑥ଶ௅(𝜎, 𝜚)|𝜎} ≥ 𝛽௅ ∙ 𝑥ଵு(𝜎) + 𝑪𝑬ద{𝑥ଶு(𝜎, 𝜚)|𝜎}  (𝐼𝐶௅ఙ) 
In Section 3.3 this problem is solved, but first we take a closer look at the incentive 
constraints at 𝑡 = 1. 
3.2. The Ad Interim Constrains 
The constraints at 𝑡 = 1 refer to the situation after the planner made the investment 
decision at 𝑡 = 0 , investors learnt their individual liquidity preference type 𝜃 ∈
{𝐻, 𝐿}, and the economy received the signal 𝜎 ∈ {𝑏, 𝑔}. Because of 𝛽ு > 𝛽௅ > 1, it is 
optimal to pay out the entire money holdings at 𝑡 = 1, so 𝜌ா(𝑏) = 𝜌ா(𝑔) = 0. 
                                                 
2 For the assumed parameter values, the optimal solution has 𝜆(𝜎) ∙ 𝜌(𝜎) = 0. 
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Due to the linear structure of the economy and since 𝛽ு > 𝛼௛, the first best efficient 
solution would be to hold the entire wealth of the economy as money at 𝑡 = 0 and 
transfer the money at 𝑡 = 1 to the investors with a high liquidity preference. So one 
would intuitively expect that the second best efficient outcome is characterized by the 
largest redistribution from 𝐿-types to 𝐻-types that still satisfies incentive compatibility – 
an intuition that will be confirmed in Section 3.3. 
For the aggregate fractional money holdings 𝜇, denote 𝑦ு(𝜇) ≔ ഋഏಹ and 𝑦௅(𝜇) ≔భషഋ
ഏಽ . Let 
𝛼෥ఙ ≔ 𝑪𝑬ద൛𝛼దห𝜎ൟ = 𝛾ఙ ∙ 𝛼ഥఙ = 𝛾ఙ ∙ 𝜋௛ఙ ∙ 𝛼௛. 
For σ ∈ {b, g} denote by μ୐஢(γ஢) the fractional money holdings such that after signal 
σ is received, the interim incentive constraint (IC୐஢) holds with equality if: 
• the entire money holdings are paid out to 𝐻-types at 𝑡 = 1 and 
• the entire returns of the illiquid investments are paid out to 𝐿-types at 𝑡 = 2. 
 
That is, for the updated level of confidence 𝛾ఙ  and the type-contingent payouts 
𝑥ଵு(𝜎) = 𝑦ு(𝜇௅ఙ(𝛾ఙ)) , 𝑥ଶு(𝜎, 𝜚) = 0 , 𝑥ଵ௅(𝜎) = 0 , 𝑥ଶ௅(𝜎, 𝜚) = 𝛼ద ∙ 𝑦௅(𝜇௅ఙ(𝛾ఙ)) , we 
have 
𝛽௅ ∙ 𝑥ଵு(𝜎) = 𝑪𝑬ద{𝑥ଶ௅(𝜎, 𝜚)ห𝜎}. 
After expanding the Choquet expected value, substituting out xଵୌ(σ)  and 
൫xଶ୐(σ, h), xଶ୐(σ, ℓ)൯, and rearranging terms, we obtain 
𝜇ఙ(𝛾) ≔ 𝜇௅ఙ(𝛾ఙ) =
𝜋ு ∙ 𝛼෤ ఙ
𝜋௅ ∙ 𝛽௅ + 𝜋ு ∙ 𝛼෤ ఙ 
where 𝛾 denotes the ex-ante level of confidence. 
Since α෥ୠ < α෥୥, it follows that μ୥(γ) > μୠ(γ). 
If for money holdings μ஢(γ)  signal σ  is received, the type-contingent payouts 
xଵୌ(σ) = yୌ(μ஢(γ)) , xଶୌ(σ, ϱ) = 0 , xଵ୐(σ) = 0 , xଶ୐(σ, ϱ) = αய ∙ y୐(μ஢(γ)) , are 
optimal. Next we determine the optimal type-contingent payouts for the case where 
money holdings and signal b fail to match. 
In case signal b  is received for money holdings μ୥(γ) , paying out the entire 
money holdings to H-types violates the incentive compatibility of investors with a 
low liquidity preference. To restore incentive compatibility, L-types will need to 
receive some payout at t = 1  over and above the entire returns of the illiquid 
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investments at t = 2. Denoting the fraction of the liquidity reserves at that are paid 
out to L-types at t = 1 by ρෝ we find:  
𝜌ො =  𝜋௅ ∙ ቆ1 −
𝛼෤ ௕
𝛼෤ ௚ቇ = 𝜋௅ ∙ ቆ1 −
𝛾௕
𝛾௚ ∙ 𝜋௛
௕ቇ. 
Next consider the opposite case with fractional money holdings 𝜇௕(𝛾) and signal g. Since 
𝜇௚(𝛾) > 𝜇௕(𝛾), the incentive constraint for 𝐿−types, (𝐼𝐶௅௚), is satisfied if the money 
holdings are paid out to 𝐻−types at 𝑡 = 1 and the returns of the illiquid assets are 
paid out to 𝐿−types at 𝑡 = 2. The incentive constraint will be satisfied, but the money 
holdings will be too low for this incentive constraint to hold with equality. Depending 
on the parameter values, the following three cases may potentially occur. 
Firstly, the type-contingent payouts xଵୌ(σ) = yୌ(μ஢(γ)), xଶୌ(σ, ϱ) = 0, xଵ୐(σ) =
0, xଶ୐(σ, ϱ) = αய ∙ y୐(μ஢(γ)),·satisfy the incentive constraint for H−types, (ICୌ୥ ), and 
are optimal. In the second case, (ICୌ୥ ) is violated but can best be restored by making 
payouts to H−types at t = 2, over and above giving them the entire money holdings 
at t = 1. In the third and final case, (ICୌ୥ ) is violated and is efficiently restored by 
liquidating some of the illiquid assets at t = 1 and paying the revenue to the H−types. 
Denote the fraction of the asset holdings that is liquidated at t = 1 by λ and the 
fraction of the illiquid assets whose revenue is paid out to H−types at t = 2 by λ෠. By 
the assumptions of Section 2.6 we have λ = 0. For (ICୌ୥ ) to be binding we must have 
𝜆෠ =  𝜋ு ∙ ቈ1 −
𝛽ு
𝛽௅ ∙
𝛾௕
𝛾௚ ∙ 𝜋௛
௕቉. 
3.3. The Ex-Ante Problem 
After having analyzed the ad interim constraints we turn our attention to the 
planner’s ex-ante decision problem. The following theorem confirms that the linear 
structure of the model allows us to focus on corner solutions.  
 
Theorem 1  Under the assumptions of Section 2.6, there exists a level of confidence 
𝛾ො ா ∈ (0,1) such that for the second best efficient money holdings we have 
𝜇ா(𝛾) ≔ ቐ
𝜇௚(𝛾) 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝛾 ∈ (𝛾ොா, 1]
𝑎𝑛𝑦 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑖𝑛 ൣ𝜇௚(𝛾), 1൧ 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝛾 =  𝛾ොா
1 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝛾 ∈ [0, 𝛾ොா)
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where 
𝜇௚(𝛾) =
𝜋ு ∙ 𝛼෥௚
𝜋௅ ∙ 𝛽௅ + 𝜋ு ∙ 𝛼෥௚ =
𝜋ு ∙ 𝛾ఙ ∙ 𝛼௛
𝜋௅ ∙ 𝛽௅ + 𝜋ு ∙ 𝛾ఙ ∙ 𝛼௛ < 1. 
 
From these optimal reserve holdings we obtain the second-best efficient contract 
(xୌ୉, x୐୉, μ୉(γ)) with for all (σ, ϱ) ∈ {b, g} × {h, ℓ}:  
 
𝑥ଵுா(𝜎) ≔
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧ 1 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝜇
ா(𝛾) = 1
ቆ1 + 𝜋௅𝜋ு ∙
𝛾௕
𝛾௚ ∙ 𝜋௛
௕ቇ ∙ 𝜇ா(𝛾) 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝜇ா(𝛾) ≠ 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜎 = 𝑏
𝜇ா(𝛾)
𝜋ு 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝜇
ா(𝛾) ≠ 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜎 = 𝑔
 
 
and xଶୌ୉(σ, ϱ) ≔ 0, as well as 
 
𝑥ଵ௅ா(𝜎) ≔
⎩⎪
⎨
⎪⎧
1 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝜇ா(𝛾) = 1
ቆ1 − 𝛾
௕
𝛾௚ ∙ 𝜋௛
௕ቇ ∙ 𝜇ா(𝛾) 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝜇ா(𝛾) ≠ 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜎 = 𝑏
0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝜇ா(𝛾) ≠ 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜎 = 𝑔
 
and 
 
𝑥ଶ௅ா(𝜎, 𝜚) ≔
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧ 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝜇
ா(𝛾) = 1
𝛼ద ∙
(1 − 𝜇ா(𝛾))
𝜋௅ 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝜇
ா(𝛾) ≠ 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜎 = 𝑏
𝛼ద ∙
(1 − 𝜇ா(𝛾))
𝜋௅ 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝜇
ா(𝛾) ≠ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜎 = 𝑔.
 
 
This follows directly from Theorem 1 and the fraction of liquidity reserves paid out 
to L−types, ρෝ, as indicated above. Other contracts which obtain the same ex-ante 
Choquet expected utility through an incentive compatible redistribution of payouts at 
t = 2 are also second-best efficient. 
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The planner’s decision problem is illustrated in Figure 1. The horizontal axis 
depicts the money holdings per type−𝐻 investor, 𝑦ு ≔ ഋഏಹ. The investment in the 
asset per 𝐿−type investor, 𝑦௅ ≔ భషഋഏಽ , is on the vertical axis. If all money holdings are 
paid out to 𝐻−types at 𝑡 = 1, each of them receives 𝑦ு. Similarly, if the returns of 
the matured investment are paid out to 𝐿−type investors, they each receive 𝛼ద ∙ 𝑦௅ 
where 𝜚 ∈ {ℎ, ℓ}. Since 𝛼ℓ = 0, we have 𝑥ଶ௅(ℓ) = 0. 
The feasibility line denotes the combinations (yୌ, y୐)  the planner can obtain 
through his ex-ante choice of money holdings and investments. The indifference 
curves relate to the indirect ex-ante utility function, V୉, assuming that if incentive 
constraints are violated, incentive compatibility is efficiently restored through 
appropriate redistributions between H−types and L−types. The (IC୐ୠ)-curve denotes 
the combinations (yୌ, y୐)  for which the incentive compatibility constraint of the 
type−L investors holds with equality after a bad signal is received. Similarly, the 
(IC୐୥)-curve denotes the combinations (yୌ, y୐) for which the incentive constraint of 
L−types holds with equality after a good signal. 
The indifference curves of V୉ have two kinks, one at the (IC୐ୠ)-curve and one at 
the (IC୐୥)-curve. The (ICୌ஢)-curves do not affect the indifference curves since the re-
distribution needed to restore (ICୌ୥ ) only involves re-distribution of income at t = 2. 
Figure 1:  The Decision Problem of the Social Planner. 
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Income at t = 2 enters the vNM utility index of both types of investors in the same 
linear way, so such redistributions do not affect the ex-ante Choquet expected utility. 
We consider three  cases. 
Firstly, to the left of the (IC୐ୠ)-line, the payouts of yୌ to H−types at t = 1 and of 
αய ∙ y୐ to L−types at t = 2 either are incentive compatible, or can be made incentive 
compatible by a redistribution of payouts at t = 2 from L−types to H−types that does 
not affect the ex-ante utility of the investors. The slope of the indifference curves is 
ಘౄ
ಘై  ∙ 
ಋ∙ಊౄಋ∙ಘ౞∙ಉ౞ = ಘౄಘై ∙ ಊౄಘ౞∙ಉ౞ , so in this area the indifference curves are steeper than the 
feasibility line whenever βୌ > π୦ ∙ α୦. 
Secondly, to the right of the (𝐼𝐶௅௕)-line but to the left of the (𝐼𝐶௅௚)-line, the payouts 
of 𝑦ு  to 𝐻−types and of 𝛼ద ∙ 𝑦௅  to 𝐿−types are incentive compatible after a good 
signal. But after a bad signal the incentive compatibility of type−𝐿  investors is 
violated and a redistribution from 𝐻 −types to 𝐿 −types is needed. The efficient 
redistribution is to continue paying out all revenues from the illiquid asset at 𝑡 = 2 to 
𝐿−types, but to provide them with some of the money holdings at 𝑡 = 1 too. As a 
consequence – as is confirmed by Theorem 1 – the indifference curves between the 
( 𝐼𝐶௅௕ )-line and the ( 𝐼𝐶௅௚ )-line are steeper than the feasibility line, due to the 
assumptions in Section 2.6. 
In the third and final case, to the right of the ( 𝐼𝐶௅௚ )-line, the incentive 
compatibility of the 𝐿−type investors is violated for both signals. After each signal, a 
redistribution from 𝐻−types to 𝐿−types is needed. The efficient redistribution is to 
continue paying all revenues from the illiquid asset at 𝑡 = 2 to 𝐿−types, but also 
providing them with some of the money holding at 𝑡 = 1. As follows from Theorem 
1, in this area the indifference curves are flatter than the feasibility line, unless 
𝛾 ≤ 𝛾ො ா. 
In Figure 1, whenever the indifference curves are steeper than the feasibility line 
to the left of (𝐼𝐶௅௚), but flatter to the right of it, 𝜇௚(𝛾) is the second best efficient 
level of money holdings. 
The expression for 𝜇௚(𝛾) in Theorem 1 indicates that for 𝛾 > 𝛾ො ா the second best 
efficient money holdings fall when the level of confidence decreases. So for 
sufficiently large levels of confidence, investment in the illiquid asset increases as the 
asset becomes more ambiguous. 
The intuition for this is as follows. The ad interim Choquet expected utility that 
investors derive from the matured illiquid asset is 𝛾ఙ ∙ 𝜋௛ఙ ∙ 𝛼௛ ∙ 𝑦௅, where a reduction 
in 𝛾  causes a reduction in the updated level of confidence 𝛾ఙ . For the incentive 
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constraint for 𝐿−type investors to be satisfied, this reduction in 𝛾ఙ must be (partially) 
compensated for by an increase in 𝑦௅ ≔ భషഋഏಽ , the only variable in the expression for 
the ad interim Choquet expected utility. This requires an increase in 1 − 𝜇 , the 
fractional investment in the illiquid asset, reducing its ‘price’ at 𝑡 = 1 and increasing 
the spread between the long term yield and the short term yield of wealth entrusted to 
the social planner at 𝑡 = 0. 
 
Corollary 2  For any two levels of confidence 𝛾 ∈ (𝛾ො ா, 1] and 𝛾′ ∈ (𝛾ො ா, 𝛾), we have 
𝜇ா(𝛾ᇱ) < 𝜇ா(𝛾), i.e. a loss of confidence in the asset returns reduces the overall 
money holdings. 
4. The Unregulated Financial Sector 
The standard form of financial intermediation to provide liquidity is by deposit taking 
institutions, typically referred to as ‘banks’. The financial sector of an economy in 
which the liquidation of illiquid assets becomes an issue is modeled as a competitive 
banking sector with free entry, in which banks have no equity. In the context of linear 
asset returns and ex-ante identical investors as in our model, the competitive banking 
sector can be represented by a single representative bank that operates under state 
contingent zero profit constraints at 𝑡 = 2 and maximizes the ex-ante utility function 
of the investors who deposit their wealth. 
4.1. Deposit contracts 
A deposit contract (𝑟ଵ, 𝑟ଶ, 𝑚) is a combination of promised payouts of either 𝑟ଵ  at 
𝑡 = 1, or 𝑟ଶ at 𝑡 = 2, and fractional liquidity reserves 𝑚. The deposit contract states 
that requests for the payout of 𝑟ଵ at 𝑡 = 1 have priority over requests for later payout 
at 𝑡 = 2 . When the requested payouts at 𝑡 = 1  exceed the bank’s capacity for 
repayment after the liquidation of its illiquid assets, the available resources are 
distributed proportional to these requests. The resulting effective payouts are denoted 
by (𝑥ଵ, 𝑥ଶ). 
The effective payouts are a function of the deposit contract (𝑟ଵ, 𝑟ଶ, 𝑚), the aggregate 
fractional withdrawals 𝑤 at 𝑡 = 1 and, in the case of 𝑥ଶ, of the asset return status 𝜚 ∈
{ℎ, ℓ}. The zero state-contingent profit condition allows for the effective payouts to be 
represented by a combination (𝑤; 𝑟, 𝑚) , where 𝑟 = 𝑟ଵ  and where (𝑟, 𝑚)  is a short 
hand for the deposit contract ൫𝑟, 𝛼௛ ∙ ೝ∙(భష೘)ೝష೘  , 𝑚൯ , using 𝑟 = ೘ഏಹ . For fractional 
aggregate withdrawals 𝑤 ∈ [0,1] the implied effective payouts are 
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𝑥ଵ(𝑤; 𝑟, 𝑚) ≔ ቐ
𝑟 𝑖𝑓 𝑤 ∈ ቂ0, ௠ ାఈ భ∙(ଵି௠)௥ ቃ
1
𝑤  ∙ [𝛼ଵ + (1 − 𝛼ଵ) ∙ 𝑚] 𝑖𝑓 𝑤 ∈ ቂ
௠ା ఈభ∙(ଵି௠)
௥ , 1ቃ
 
and 
 
𝑥ଶ(𝑤, 𝜚; 𝑟, 𝑚)
≔  
⎩
⎪⎪
⎨
⎪⎪
⎧ 11 − 𝑤  ∙  ൣ𝑚 − 𝑤 ∙ 𝑟 + 𝛼ద ∙ (1 − 𝑚)൧ 𝑖𝑓 𝑤 ∈ ቂ0,
𝑚
𝑟 ቃ
𝛼ద
1 − 𝑤  ∙  ൤1 + ൬
1
𝛼ଵ − 1൰ ∙ 𝑚 −
1
𝛼ଵ ∙ 𝑤 ∙ 𝑟൨ 𝑖𝑓 𝑤 ∈ ൤
𝑚
𝑟 ,
𝑚 + 𝛼ଵ ∙ (1 − 𝑚)
𝑟 ൨
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑤 ∈ ൤𝑚 + 𝛼ଵ ∙ (1 − 𝑚)𝑟 , 1൨
 
The effective payouts 𝑥ଵ(𝑤;∙), 𝑥ଶ(𝑤, ℎ;∙) and 𝑥ଶ(𝑤, ℓ;∙) are depicted in Figure 2. 
  
Figure 2: Effective Payouts at 𝑡 = 1 and 𝑡 = 2. 
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4.2. The Representative Bank’s Decision Problem 
At 𝑡 = 0 the representative bank offers a deposit contract that maximizes the ex-ante 
Choquet expected utility of the (ex-ante identical) individual investors. The investors are 
assumed to have perfect foresight regarding the aggregate withdrawal behavior at 𝑡 = 1. 
As each individual investor is negligible, the aggregate withdrawal behavior is assumed 
to be independent of the investor’s own behavior. In particular, for the individual 
investors, the dynamic inconsistency in the behavior of the other investors is known and 
anticipated, but the dynamic inconsistency of their own behavior is not. At 𝑡 = 0, the ex-
ante Choquet expected utility is maximized with respect to the beliefs 
൫𝜋, {𝐹ఏ}ఏ∈{ு,௅}, 𝛾൯. 
The decision problem of the representative bank is 
max(௥,ఓ),ధ,ఒ(ధ),ఘ(ధ) 𝑪𝑬(ఏ,ఙ,ద){𝑢(𝑥(𝜛(𝜎; 𝑟, 𝜇), 𝜚; 𝑟, 𝜇); 𝜃)} 
such that 
𝜛 ≔ 𝜛(𝜎; 𝑟, 𝜇) ∈ 𝜛∗(𝜎; 𝑟, 𝜇)      (𝐸)  
𝜛 ∙ 𝑥ଵ(𝜛;∙) = ൫1 − 𝜌(𝜛)൯ ∙ [𝜇 + 𝛼ଵ ∙ 𝜆(𝜛) ∙ (1 − 𝜇)]   (𝐹ଵ) 
(1 − 𝜛) ∙ 𝑥ଶ(𝜛, ℎ;∙) = 
 𝜌(𝜛) ∙ [𝜇 + 𝛼ଵ ∙ 𝜆(𝜛) ∙ (1 − 𝜇)] + 𝛼௛ ∙ (1 − 𝜆(𝜛)) ∙ (1 − 𝜇) (𝐹ଶ௛) 
 (1 − 𝜛) ∙ 𝑥ଶ(𝜛, ℓ;∙) = 𝜌(𝜛) ∙ [𝜇 + 𝛼ଵ ∙ 𝜆(𝜛) ∙ (1 − 𝜇)]    (𝐹ଶℓ). 
Here 𝜛∗(𝜎; 𝑟, 𝜇) denotes the set of withdrawal equilibria for the deposit contract 
(𝑟, 𝜇)  when the signal 𝜎  is obtained; 𝜌  denotes the fraction of reserve holdings 
transferred from 𝑡 = 1 to 𝑡 = 2; and 𝜆 denotes the fraction of assets liquidated at 𝑡 =
1. Constraint (𝐸) demands a withdrawal equilibrium; (𝐹ଵ) is the feasibility constraint 
for 𝑡 = 1 and (𝐹ଶ௛ ) and (𝐹ଶℓ ) are the feasibility constraints for 𝑡 = 2 if the asset 
returns status is ℎ and ℓ, respectively. 
The formulation of the optimization problem assumes that at 𝑡 = 1 the best possible 
withdrawal equilibrium is obtained. This implies that banking panics (i.e. simultaneous 
bank runs on all individual banks in the competitive banking sector) only occur if they 
are the unique withdrawal equilibrium. Bank runs and banking panics that result from 
coordination failures amongst the depositors are disregarded. 
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4.3. Ad Interim Withdrawal Equilibria 
In solving the decision problem of the representative bank, we first consider the 
withdrawal equilibria 𝜛∗(𝜎; 𝑟, 𝜇)  at 𝑡 = 1 . For this it is assumed that at 𝑡 = 0  all 
investors deposited their entire wealth in the bank. 
Firstly, consider a deposit contract (𝑟, 𝜇)  such that after receiving signal 𝜎  the 
incentive constraint for the 𝐿−type investors is violated if all 𝐻−types withdraw at 𝑡 = 1. 
That is, if for the effective payouts 𝑥ଵ(𝜋ு; 𝑟, 𝜇) and 𝑥ଶ(𝜋ு, 𝜚; 𝑟, 𝜇) and we have 
𝛽௅ ∙ 𝑥ଵ(𝜋ு; 𝑟, 𝜇) > 𝑪𝑬ద{𝑥ଶ(𝜋ு, 𝜚; 𝑟, 𝜇)|𝜎}. 
All investors will withdraw their deposits at 𝑡 = 1 , which results in a run on the 
representative bank. This banking panic is inevitable given the effective payouts of the 
deposit contract. It is a fundamental run on the representative bank and, in the 
terminology of Freixas and Rochet (2008), reflects a fundamental banking panic. 
Secondly, consider deposit contracts (𝑟, 𝜇) such that after receiving signal 𝜎 and for 
assumed withdrawals 𝜛 = 𝜋ு the incentive constrains (𝐼𝐶ுఙ) and (𝐼𝐶௅ఙ) are satisfied for 
the effective payouts 𝑥ଵ and 𝑥ଶ. In one of the withdrawal equilibria only type−𝐻 investors 
withdraw their deposits; another withdrawal equilibrium is a banking panic, which is 
disregarded. 
Finally, consider deposit contracts (𝑟, 𝜇)  such that after receiving signal σ the 
incentive compatibility constraint of 𝐻 −type investors for the effective payouts is 
violated for 𝜛 = 𝜋ு i.e. 
𝛽ு ∙ 𝑥ଵ(𝜋ு; 𝑟, 𝜇) < 𝑪𝑬ద{𝑥ଶ(𝜋ு, 𝜚; 𝑟, 𝜇)|𝜎}. 
In equilibrium some of the affected investors will now defer withdrawing until 𝑡 = 2. As 
a consequence, the representative bank must transfer some of its reserve holdings from 
𝑡 = 1 to 𝑡 = 2 , which reduces the expected effective payouts at 𝑡 = 2 for 𝜚 = ℎ  to a 
value below 𝑥ଶ(𝜋ு, ℎ; 𝑟, 𝜇). As before, a second withdrawal equilibrium is a banking 
panic, which is disregarded unless 𝑥ଵ(1; 𝑟, 𝜇) > 𝑪𝑬ద{𝑥ଶ(1, 𝜚; 𝑟, 𝜇)|𝜎}.  
4.4. Ex-Ante Reserve Holdings 
Now we have determined the relevant withdrawal equilibria, we consider the fractional 
reserve holdings that solve the decision problem of the representative bank. This requires 
a separate analysis of each of the above three possibilities for withdrawal equilibrium for 
the signals 𝑏 and 𝑔. 
The decision problem of the representative bank is illustrated in Figure 3. The 
feasibility line and the ad interim incentive constraints are the same as in Figure 1. 
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Figure 3:  The Decision Problem for the Representative Bank 
 
In Figure 3, the indifference curves of the representative bank are those of the indirect 
ex-ante utility function 𝑉஻ , which is obtained as follows. For an equilibrium in the 
competitive banking sector, the efficient payout condition must be satisfied, which 
requires 𝑟ଵ = ഋഏಹ and 𝑟ଶ = 𝛼௛ ∙ భషഋഏಽ . Now, in specifying the actions of the representative 
bank for ‘non-equilibrium’ reserve holdings, the promised payouts are assumed to 
remain 𝑟ଵ = ഋഏಹ and 𝑟ଶ = 𝛼௛ ∙ భషഋഏಽ  , even if they lead to banking panics that might have 
been prevented by different promised repayments. The alternative assumption that the 
banks adapt their promised repayment would lead to a different indirect utility function 
for this institutional setting, based on different out-of-equilibrium behavior. 
 The contracts for non-equilibrium reserve holdings as assumed here lead to 
indifference curves of 𝑉஻ as in Figure 3. To the right of the (𝐼𝐶௅௚)-curve, a fundamental 
banking panic occurs after each signal 𝜎 ∈ {𝑏, 𝑔} , which leads to steep indifference 
curves. On the (𝐼𝐶௅௚)-curve there will be no fundamental banking panic after a good 
signal, which causes the indifference curve to ‘jump inward’. 
Between the (𝐼𝐶௅௚)-curve and the (𝐼𝐶௅௕)-curve, there will be a banking panic after a 
bad signal but not after a good signal. Therefore, the indifference curves in this area are less 
steep than the ones to the right of the (𝐼𝐶௅௚)-curve. On and to the left of the (𝐼𝐶௅௕)-curve 
there will be no banking panic after either signal. Therefore, on the (𝐼𝐶௅௕ )-curve the 
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indifference curves once again ‘jump inward’, with indifference curves being flatter to 
the left of the (𝐼𝐶௅௕)-curve. 
In Figure 3, the case is depicted in which the (𝐼𝐶ு௚)-curve is to the left of the (𝐼𝐶௅௕)-
curve, without the (𝐼𝐶ு௚)-curve being included in the figure. For the solution of the 
decision problem, the area to the left of the (𝐼𝐶ு௚) is not relevant. 
The case in which the (𝐼𝐶ு௚)-curve is to the right of the (𝐼𝐶௅௕)-curve is not depicted. 
The precise shape of the indifference curves in the area between the (𝐼𝐶ு௚)-curve and the 
(𝐼𝐶௅௕)-curve is not relevant for the solution of the representative bank’s decision problem. 
The following proposition results. 
 
Proposition 3  For the equilibrium fractional reserve holdings we have 
𝜇஻(𝛾) ∈ ൛𝜇௕(𝛾), 𝜇௚(𝛾), 1ൟ. 
As can be seen in Figure 3, a reduction in the level of confidence affects the indifference 
curves for the representative bank in two ways. Firstly, the ad interim incentive constraints 
are rotated counter-clockwise. Secondly, the indifference curves become steeper. A 
reduction in the level of confidence makes investment in the illiquid asset less attractive, 
so a larger amount of the illiquid asset is needed to satisfy the relevant incentive 
constraint, leading to a reduction in reserve holdings. 
Similar as in Corollary 2 for second best efficient money holdings, a ‘small’ reduction 
in the level of confidence leads to a decrease in the representative bank’s equilibrium 
reserve holdings and to an increase in investments in the illiquid asset. This is formalized 
in the following corollary. 
 
Corollary 4  Let 𝛾ᇱ, 𝛾′′ ∈ (𝛾ොா, 1] be such that for some 𝜎 ∈ {𝑏, 𝑔} we have both 𝜇஻(𝛾ᇱ) =
𝜇ఙ(𝛾ᇱ) and 𝜇஻(𝛾ᇱᇱ) = 𝜇ఙ(𝛾ᇱᇱ). Now 
𝛾ᇱ < 𝛾ᇱᇱ ⇔ 𝜇஻(𝛾ᇱ) < 𝜇஻(𝛾ᇱᇱ). 
5. Comparison 
The analysis in Section 3 and Section 4 enables us to address the question whether the 
outcome of the financial sector, as obtained by the representative bank, is second best 
efficient. In Section 5.1 we find that the outcome fails to be second best efficient, which 
implies that the counter part of the ‘invisible hand’ fails to hold in the setting of financial 
crises, even when making allowances for the information constraints. In Section 5.2 we 
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consider the question which policy measures which may restore second best efficiency. We 
find that minimum reserve requirements are ineffective, but that the ex-ante commitment 
to an appropriate revenue neutral tax-and-subsidize policy results in a second best 
efficient outcome. 
5.1. Inefficient Outcomes 
When comparing the solutions for the decision problems of the social planner and the 
representative bank, the graphical analysis outlined in Section 2.5 proves useful. It 
enables the comparison of the two ex-ante decision problems of Figure 1 and Figure 3 in 
one single diagram, facilitating the analysis. 
 Figure 4 compares the decision problem of the representative bank with that of the 
social planner. To the right of the (𝐼𝐶௅௕)-curve, the ex-ante utility derived from aggregate 
fractional reserve holdings 𝜇 through the competitive banking sector is less than the ex-
ante utility achieved by the social planner for the same fractional money holdings. The 
reason is that the competitive banking sector has less possibilities for ad interim 
redistribution between the two types of investors. 
In his choice of contracts, the planner is only restricted by feasibility and incentive 
compatibility constraints. When the incentive constraint for 𝐿−type investors is violated 
after signal 𝜎, the more extensive possibilities for redistribution available to the planner 
 
Figure 4:  Comparison of Bank and Social Planner for 𝛾 < 1. 
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come to bear. They result in a better liquidity allocation than the competitive banking 
sector can provide. The deposit contracts offered in the competitive banking sector do 
not give banks the opportunity to restore incentive compatibility by allowing 𝐿−type 
investors to withdraw some of their deposits at 𝑡 = 1 without reducing their effective 
payouts at 𝑡 = 2. As a consequence, a fundamental banking panic and the resulting loss 
of ex-ante utility are inevitable if (𝐼𝐶௅ఙ) is violated. 
Things are different if (𝐼𝐶ுఙ)  is violated. In the case of ‘small’ violations of the 
incentive compatibility constraint of 𝐻−type investors, incentive compatibility can be 
restored by some of them deferring their withdrawal to 𝑡 = 2. Some of the money 
holdings at 𝑡 = 1  must be transferred to 𝑡 = 2 . This leads to a reduction in the 
expected effective payouts at 𝑡 = 2, which may restore incentive compatibility. In Figure 
4, the indifference curves of the indirect ex-ante utility function 𝑉஻ would have a strictly 
convex shape where this applies. 
The violation of the incentive constraint for investors with a high liquidity preference 
may, however, be such that the incentive constraint remains violated even if all 
type−𝐻 investors withdraw at 𝑡 = 2. In the area of Figure 4 in which this arises, the 
indifference curves for the representative bank are linear. 
As is indicated in Theorem 1, under the assumptions of Section 2.6, the second best 
efficient aggregate fractional money holding is either 𝜇௚(𝛾) or 1. Under these 
assumptions equilibria in the competitive banking sector with a fractional reserve holding 
of 𝜇௕(𝛾) fail to be second best efficient. But even if the fractional reserve holdings in the 
banking sector are 𝜇௚(𝛾),  the second best efficient liquidity allocation fails to be 
obtained. When a bad signal regarding the prospects of the asset is received, a 
fundamental banking panic occurs and the investments in the illiquid asset will be 
liquidated. By contrast, a social planner would restore incentive compatibility by 
allocating part of the money holdings at 𝑡 = 1 to type−𝐿 investors without reducing their 
payouts at 𝑡 = 2. 
This leads to the following result. 
 
Theorem 5  Under the assumptions of Section 2.6, no deposit contract (𝑟, 𝜇) with 𝜇 < 1 
implements the second best efficient liquidity allocation. 
5.2. Restoring Second Best Efficiency 
In a competitive banking sector representing the financial sector as above with 𝛾 ∈ (𝛾ොா, 1], 
as in Theorem 5, there are two possible reasons why the liquidity allocation may fail to be 
second-best efficient. Firstly, the decision problem of the representative bank may be 
solved for the inefficient fractional reserve holdings 𝜇௕(𝛾), rather than for the second 
best efficient reserve holdings 𝜇௚(𝛾). But, secondly, even if the reserve holdings are at 
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the second best efficient level 𝜇௚(𝛾), there will be a fundamental banking panic — i.e. 
an unavoidable financial crisis — after the bad signal is received. This financial crisis 
leads to the inefficient liquidation of illiquid assets. 
A regulator can solve this second problem by restoring the incentive compatibility 
constraint of type−𝐿 investors after a bad signal. One way of doing this is by a revenue 
neutral combination of taxes and subsidies at 𝑡 = 1 . Investors who withdraw their 
deposits at 𝑡 = 1 pay a tax, which is used at 𝑡 = 1 to subsidize investors who do not 
withdraw. For an appropriate combination of tax and subsidies, the second-best liquidity 
allocation is obtained. 
The next question is how a regulator can address the potential problem of inefficient 
money holdings 𝜇௕(𝛾).  In the absence of regulation dealing with financial crises, 
minimum reserve requirements fail to improve the liquidity allocation, as the equilibrium 
reserve holdings 𝜇௕(𝛾) are lower than 𝜇௚(𝛾), but they lead to a higher ex-ante utility; if 
this would not be the case, the representative bank would have chosen 𝜇௚(𝛾) rather 
than 𝜇௕(𝛾). 
There is, however, a more subtle solution to the problem. The regulator can credibly 
announce to implement a policy of taxes and subsidies that ensures second-best efficient 
contingent payouts whenever a bad signal is received for money holdings 𝜇௚(𝛾). This 
policy is now anticipated by the financial sector and by the investors, whose decisions 
are based on the suitably adapted effective payouts. As a result, competition within the 
financial sector leads to the deposit contract ቀഋ೒(ം)ഏಹ , 𝜇௚(𝛾)ቁ which now implements the 
second best efficient liquidity allocation. 
This leads to the following result. 
 
Theorem 6  Under the assumptions of Section 2.6, a second best efficient outcome can be 
implemented by the regulator’s commitment to a revenue neutral tax-and-subsidize 
policy which ensures ad interim efficient payouts given the financial sector’s money 
holdings. 
 
At first glance, it may seem that the credible announcement of the ‘bail out policy’ by the 
regulator inappropriately creates a moral hazard problem. The policy ‘tempts’ the 
financial sector to ‘carelessly’ risk a financial crisis after a bad signal, rather than 
‘prudently’ ensuring no fundamental crisis can occur. ‘Greedy’ investors are but too 
willing to play along, as they can rely on the regulator to ‘bail them out’ if and when a 
fundamental financial crisis occurs. 
This impression, however, is misleading. In an unregulated financial sector, crises lead 
to the liquidation of assets, which can be very costly. Both the financial sector and 
SPANJERS     Liquidity Provision, Ambiguous Asset Returns and the Financial Crisis 
 
 399
investors may consider inefficiently low reserve holdings that prevent crises to be the 
‘lesser evil’. 
But in the presence of a credibly announced ‘bail out policy’ a (potential) financial 
crisis no longer leads to the costly and inefficient liquidation of assets. Therefore, the 
financial sector no longer needs to choose the ‘lesser evil’ of inefficiently low reserve 
holdings. It can increase reserve holdings to the level that is required for the ex-ante 
second best efficient redistribution at of wealth from investors with a low preference for 
liquidity to investors with a high liquidity preference. 
The ‘bail out policy’ of the regulator does not inappropriately create a moral hazard 
problem, but rather provides an antidote to the inefficiencies created by the deposit 
contract’s prioritizing of withdrawals at 𝑡 = 1 over those at 𝑡 = 2. 
6. Failure to Recognize Ambiguity 
The failure of the financial sector to recognize the presence of ambiguity in investors’ beliefs 
can have severe consequences. Analyzing these consequences is the purpose of this section. 
Strictly speaking, the question is outside the framework of the model and a thorough analysis 
would require a more general formal framework. 
The construction of the imagined representative bank is based on the combination of 
competition in the banking sector and perfect foresight by the investors. Under these 
assumptions, the failure of the representative bank to recognize the presence of ambiguity 
implies the failure of investors themselves to recognize presence of ambiguity. As long as 
investors have perfect foresight and recognize the presence of ambiguity in the economy, 
competition forces the banks to act accordingly, even if they do not agree. Therefore, the 
failure of the financial sector to recognize the presence of ambiguity to some extent violates 
the internal logic of the model. 
This being said, the issue itself seems to be of practical relevance and deserves 
consideration in the context of this paper. The assumptions of the model — including the 
representation of the financial sector by a competitive banking sector – are abstractions 
from reality. So even if some relevant issues are not fully covered by a model’s internal 
logic, the model can still shed some light on them. In particular, by offering a logically 
consistent benchmark, it can provide a starting point for economic thinking that surpasses 
the model’s boundaries. This approach to understanding economic issues is the basis for 
the following analysis. 
We start by assuming that the effective payouts (𝑥ଵ, 𝑥ଶ) implied by the deposit 
contract obtained in the competitive banking sector are exogenously guaranteed. Thus, 
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the beliefs of the investors do not correct the mistaken beliefs of the banks through the 
competitive process. 
We consider two ways in which the financial sector may fail to recognize the presence 
of ambiguity. The first way basically assumes that the financial sector is ambiguity 
neutral. It ignores the presence of ambiguity and treats the probability estimate 𝜋 as if it 
was a (subjective) probability distribution held with full confidence. Alternatively, the 
financial sector may treat the weighting of the states of nature in the investors’ ex-ante 
utility function as a subjective probability estimate. Due to the presence of ambiguity, this 
implied weighting differs from the probability estimate 𝜋. 
When the financial sector shares the investors’ probability assessment but wrongly 
assumes a level of confidence 𝛾 = 1 , it offers deposit contracts (𝑟, 𝑚) =
ቀഋ഑(భ)ഏಹ , 𝜇ఙ(1)ቁ. Since 𝜇ఙ(1) > 𝜇ఙ(𝛾) the actual incentive constraint of type−𝐿 investors 
will unexpectedly be violated when the signal 𝜎  occurs. The financial sector will be 
confronted with a (fundamental!) crisis it is unable to explain. 
If a regulator is committed to the policy of taxes and subsidies as in Theorem 6, the 
aggregate money holdings would be 𝜇௚(1) > 𝜇௚(𝛾). After either signal, a crisis would be 
imminent and regulatory intervention would be required. 
The second, more sophisticated, way in which the financial sector may fail to 
recognize the presence of ambiguity is by mis-interpreting the weights of the states of 
nature in the investors’ ex-ante utility function as a (subjective) probability distribution 𝜋ෝ. 
In general settings with ambiguity, this will not lead to a unique probability distribution. 
The weights change when different payout profiles are considered that fail to be co-
monotonic, e.g. profiles that obtain their worst case in different states of nature. But for 
the specific payouts that occur in a competitive banking sector, the weights are consistent 
with a unique (subjective) probability distribution 𝜋ො. 
Consider a representative bank with reserve holdings ?̂?௚(1) based on 𝜋ො. For the implied 
effective payouts we have 𝑢(𝑥ு(𝑔, 𝜚); 𝐻) > 𝑢(𝑥ு(𝑏, 𝜚); 𝐻)  and 𝑢(𝑥௅(𝑔, ℎ); 𝐿) >
𝑢(𝑥௅(𝑏, 𝜚); 𝐿) > 𝑢(𝑥௅(𝑔, ℓ); 𝐿). In the ex-ante utility function of the investors, this leads 
to the following weighting of the states (𝜃, 𝜎, 𝜚): 
 
 (𝑏, ℎ) (𝑏, ℓ) (𝑔, ℎ) (𝑔, ℓ) 
𝐻 𝜋ு ∙ (1 − 𝛾 + 𝛾 ∙ (𝛿 + 𝜀)) 𝜋ு ∙ 𝛾 ∙ (1 − (𝛿 + 𝜀)) 
𝐿 𝜋௅ ∙ 𝛾 ∙ 𝛿 𝜋௅ ∙ 𝛾
∙ 𝜀 
𝜋௅ ∙ 𝛾 ∙ (1 − (𝛿 + 𝜀)) 𝜋௅ ∙ (1 − 𝛾) 
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These weights are consistent with one of the weightings obtained for reserve holdings 
𝜇ො௕(1) and 𝜇 = 1. So the financial sector’s assumption that it is dealing with investors 
whose preferences can be represented by a subjective expected utility function is not 
obviously proven wrong. 
Still, when interpreted as a probability distribution, these weights imply that the 
probability of receiving a bad signal conditional on having a high liquidity preference, 
𝜃 = 𝐻, differs from the probability of receiving a bad signal conditional on having a low 
liquidity preference, 𝜃 = 𝐿 . This ‘pessimistic superstition’ of the investors may raise 
suspicion in the financial sector, since it is not justified by the basic structure of liquidity 
preference and asset returns. 
This superstition turns into a more serious problem when investors’ ex-ante beliefs 
are updated at 𝑡 = 1. For this updating the Dempster-Shafer rule is used, which leads 
to the following ad interim weights of the states of nature for an investor of type 𝐿, 
taking into account the effective payouts as above: 
 
 (𝑏, ℎ)|𝑏 (𝑏, ℓ)|𝑏 (𝑔, ℎ)|𝑔 (𝑔, ℓ)|𝑔 
𝐿 ఊ∙ఋఊ∙(ఋାఌ)ା(ଵିఊ) 
ఊ∙ఌା(ଵିఊ)
ఊ∙(ఋାఌ)ା(ଵିఊ) 
ఊ∙(ଵି(ఋାఌ))
ଵିఊ∙(ఋାఌ)
ଵିఊ
ଵିఊ∙(ఋାఌ) 
 
But being unaware of the presence of ambiguity, the financial sector updates the 
probability distribution 𝜋ෝ by using Bayes’ rule. Regarding a type−𝐿 investor this leads to 
the updated probability distribution 
 
 (𝑏, ℎ)|𝑏 (𝑏, ℓ)|𝑏 (𝑔, ℎ)|𝑔 (𝑔, ℓ)|𝑔 
L ఋ
ఋାఌ 
ఌ
ఋାఌ 
ఊ∙(ଵି(ఋାఌ))
ଵିఊ∙(ఋାఌ)  
ଵିఊ
ଵିఊ∙(ఋାఌ) 
 
For aggregate fractional reserve holdings 𝜇ො௚(1)  based on 𝜋ෝ , the financial sector 
anticipates a fundamental crisis after a bad signal. After a bad signal, this fundamental 
crisis occurs on the basis of the investors’ actual beliefs. After a good signal, the weights 
assigned by the update of 𝜋ෝ  coincide with the weights that result for the ambiguous 
beliefs. The actual incentive constraint of 𝐿 −types after a good signal equals the 
incentive constraint as anticipated by the financial sector. We have 𝜇ො௚(1) = 𝜇௚(𝛾) and 
it remains unnoticed that the financial sector is unaware of the presence of ambiguity. 
For money holdings 𝜇ො௕(1) however, things are different. For the effective payouts of 
the associated deposit contract we now have 𝑥௅(𝑔, ℎ) = 𝑥௅(𝑏, ℎ) > 𝑥௅(𝑔, ℓ) = 𝑥௅(𝑏, ℓ), 
leading to the ex-ante weights 
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 {(𝑏, ℎ), (𝑔, ℎ)} {(𝑏, ℓ), (𝑔, ℓ)} 
𝐻 𝜋ு 
𝐿 𝜋௅ ∙ 𝛾 ∙ (1 − 𝜀) 𝜋௅ ∙ (1 − 𝛾) ∙ (1 − 𝜀) 
 
which are consistent with the weights obtained for 𝜇ො௚(1). 
After the bad signal, the financial sector finds that type− 𝐿  investors put an 
unexpectedly high weight on the state (𝑏, ℓ). The investors apply the Dempster-Shafer 
rule to update their beliefs, resulting in an implied weight of ം∙ഄశ(భషം)ം∙(ഃశഄ)శ(భషം), whereas the 
financial sector anticipated the lower weight of ഄഃశഄ. Therefore, the ad interim incentive 
constraint of type−𝐿 investors is violated and a fundamental crisis occurs. 
This fundamental crisis takes the financial sector by surprise. It assumed that for its 
reserve holdings the incentive compatibility constraint of 𝐿−types would be satisfied even 
after a bad signal. From the perspective of the financial sector, the crisis is caused by an 
‘irrational overreaction’ of the investors with a low liquidity preference, who ‘lose their 
nerves’ in the face of bad news. In reality, the financial sector is facing a fundamental 
crisis, caused by its own failure to recognize the presence of ambiguity in investors’ 
beliefs. 
In an economy where the financial sector fails to recognize ambiguity in investors’ 
beliefs, two types of regulatory policy come to mind. The first is the policy 
announcement suggested in Theorem 6 with levels of taxes and subsidies that reflect the 
presence of ambiguity. This leads to the second best efficient liquidity allocation even if 
the financial sector misinterprets the weightings in the ex-ante utility functions as 
probabilities. 
The second type of regulatory policy surpasses the financial sector. It aims at creating 
an institutional framework which enhances the level of confidence investors have in their 
probability estimates. This requires measures that increase the stability and transparency 
of the economy as a whole, including the predictability of (competent) economic policy. 
7. Concluding Remarks 
7.1. Dynamic Inconsistency 
The presence of ambiguity leads to dynamic inconsistency in investors’ beliefs. After 
receiving non- conclusive information, decision makers tend to deviate from the 
contingent course of action they initially planned. 
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This raises the question whether dynamic inconsistency should be regarded as an 
inherent property of decision making under ambiguity or, alternatively, as an undesirable 
artefact of the mathematical model used for its representation. 
In the context of decisions made in the presence of ambiguity, Keynes (1937, pp. 114) 
states: 
‘How do we manage in such circumstances to behave in a manner which 
saves our faces as rational, economic man? We have devised for the 
purpose a variety of techniques, of which the most important are the 
three following: 
(1) We assume that the present is a much more servicable guide to the 
future than a candid examination of past experience would show it to 
have been hitherto. In other words, we largely ignore the prospect of 
future changes about the actual character of which we know nothing. 
(2) We assume that the existing state of opinion as expressed in prices 
and the character of existing output is based on a correct summing up 
of future prospects, so that we can accept it as such unless and until 
something new and relevant comes into the picture. 
(3) Knowing that our own individual judgment is worthless, we endeavor 
to fall back on the judgment of the rest of the world which is perhaps 
better informed. That is, we endeavor to conform with the behavior of 
the majority or the average. The psychology of a society of 
individuals each of whom is endeavoring to copy others leads to what 
we may strictly term a conventional judgment.’ 
 
This quotation — in particular the combination of points (1) and (2) — can be taken as 
an indication  that Keynes considers dynamic inconsistency to be an inherent behavioral 
aspect of decision making under ambiguity. Keynes continues (Keynes, 1937, pp. 114 - 
115): 
‘Now a practical theory of the future [...] has certain marked 
characteristics. In particular, being based on so flimsy a foundation, it is 
subject to sudden and violent changes. The practice of calmness and 
immobility, of certainty and security, suddenly breaks down. New fears 
and hopes will, without warning, take charge of human conduct. The 
forces of disillusion may suddenly impose a new conventional basis of 
valuation. All the pretty, polite techniques, made for a well-pannelled 
board room and a nicely regulated market, are liable to collapse. At all 
times vague panic fears and equally vague and unreasoned hopes are not 
really lulled and lie but a little way below the surface.’ 
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which provides further support for this view. From this perspective, approaches that find 
conditions under which dynamic inconsistency in updating beliefs under ambiguity fails 
to occur, would be interpreted as identifying exceptional cases in which the basic 
mechanism fails to apply. For a discussion of these issues see e.g. Epstein and Le Breton 
(1993), Hanany and Klibanoff (2009) and Siniscalchi (2011). 
7.2. Policy Implications 
The model suggests that the second best efficient liquidity allocation will be obtained by 
a financial sector in which a bail out policy is credibly announced and implemented as in 
Theorem 6. In the case of an imminent crisis, where the violation of the relevant ad 
interim incentive constraint may have created the equivalent of a ‘Minsky moment’, the 
policy taxes withdrawals and uses the proceeds to subsidize those who do not withdraw 
their deposits at 𝑡 = 1. Being a revenue neutral redistribution of resources at 𝑡 = 1, it has 
the advantage of not requiring the provision of additional funding or liquidity. 
In reality, however, implementing such a policy on short notice may fail to be feasible. 
It may be more promising to combat an imminent crisis by use of more flexible 
instruments. These could include the provision of additional liquidity by central banks 
through lowering interest rates and by quantitative easing. They could also include the 
underwriting of ‘toxic assets’ and the bailing out of distressed banks by governments. 
The underwriting of ‘toxic assets’ and bailing out distressed banks reduces the 
ambiguity regarding banks’ ability to honor future withdrawals, increasing the (Choquet) 
expected payout of these withdrawals. In the context of our model, this can be interpreted 
as a subsidy to investors who leave their money in the bank. It helps to restore the 
incentive compatibility for the investors with a low liquidity preference. 
Similarly, flooding the financial markets with liquidity allows more investors to take 
advantage of idiosyncratic favorable opportunities, potentially reducing the value of such 
opportunities to the investors with a low liquidity preference and those with a high 
liquidity preference alike. In the model, this is would be reflected by either a decrease of 
𝛽௅  and 𝛽ு , or by a tax on withdrawals at 𝑡 = 1. By making withdrawals at 𝑡 = 1 less 
attractive, flooding the market with liquidity helps restoring the incentive compatibility 
for type−𝐿 investors. 
Therefore, the combination of flooding the market with liquidity on the one hand and 
underwriting toxic assets and bailing out distressed banks on the other, effectively 
implements the proposed policy of taxes and subsidies by  using the instruments readily 
available to policy makers. 
A second type of regulatory policy would focus on reducing the level of ambiguity 
faced by the investors, i.e. by increasing the level of confidence. This requires a broader 
SPANJERS     Liquidity Provision, Ambiguous Asset Returns and the Financial Crisis 
 
 405
based approach which emphasizes stability, transparency and predictability of economic 
policy measures. It resembles the kind of institutional framework advocated by the ‘ordo-
liberalism’ of the ‘Freiburger Schule’. This approach is at the heart of the ‘soziale 
Marktwirtschaft’, the basis of the ‘Wirtschaftswunder’ — the German economic miracle 
in the 1950s and 1960s — and much of EU economic policy thereafter. For a more 
general discussion on this and related issues see Spanjers and Agliardi (2016). 
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